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COMMENTS
ANTITRUST LAWS-JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION

United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.-Government victory in
establishing an antitrust violation brings economic victory only if
the government can win the final battle for an effective relief decree. Yet this "most significant"1 aspect of an antitrust case often
receives comparatively little attention from the parties,2 the courts3
and legal writers. 4 The lack of judicial guides in a relief determination is especially keen with regard to corporate acquisitions of
stock or assets which violate section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 Because
of this dearth of case authority, the recent district court decision in
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 6 becomes extremely significant in indicating the problems that may arise in
section 7 relief actions and the judicial process for their solution.
The court's discussion of remedies is particularly important at
this time because of the current extensive use of amended7 section
7 by both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade ComSEVEN OF THE CLAYTON ACT-DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN

1 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 at
2 See Adams, "Dissolution, Divorcement and Divestiture:

89 (1950).
The Pyrrhic Victories of

Antitrust,'' 27 IND. L.J. 1 at 32 (1951).
8 See Kilgore, "Antitrust Judgments and Their Enforcement," 5 A.B.A. REP., ANTITRUST
SECrION, 102 (1954).
4 On Sherman Act remedies, see REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COM•
MrITEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 353-358 (1955); Adams, "Dissolution, Divorcement
and Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust," 27 IND. L.J. 1 (1951); Oppenheim,
Timberg and Van Cise, "Symposium-Divestiture as a Remedy Under the Federal Antitrust
Laws,'' 19 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 119 (1950); and Marcus, "Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust Judgments Through Hartford-Empire,'' 34 GEO. L.J. 1 (1945).
5 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §18: "No
corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of
the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly."
6 (N.D. Ill. 1959) 177 F. Supp. 1, probable jurisdiction noted, 28 U.S. LA.w WEEK 3346
(1960) (hereafter referred to in the text as "du Pont" and in the footnotes as "principal
case"). See also United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., (N.D. Ill. 1954) 126
F. Supp. 235, holding that du Pont, General Motors, Christiana Securities Co. and
Delaware Realty and Investment Co. had not violated §§1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
and that du Pont had not violated §7 of the Clayton Act. But in 353 U.S. 586 (1957), the
Supreme Court reversed the finding as to §7, holding that du Pont violated that section
because its acquisition of General Motors stock tended to restrain trade and create a
monopoly in the market for automotive fabrics and finishes; the Coart remanded the
case to the district court for determination of the appropriate relief. [The two preceding
district and Supreme Court cases are hereafter referred to as United States v. du Pont.]
7 See note 5 supra.
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mission.8 Although the commission and the courts do not consider
themselves strictly bound by precedent in relief determinations,9
they do need to establish general principles for their resolution of
the peculiar factual problems of each section 7 case.
This comment will approach section 7 relief questions and
solutions primarily in the light of du Pont's unique facts, which
included a vertical stock acquisition made thirty years before the
judicial proceeding1° plus the complicating factors of vast financial
interests,11 numerous innocent investors12 and several corporate
interrelationships.13 Thereby were posed complex problems regarding (I) parties to the relief determination, (2) interests to be
affected by the decree and (3) the manner of affecting those interests.

I.

THE ALTERNATIVES AND THE COURT'S CHOICE:
DISENFRANCHISEMENT

The government contended that complete divestiture of the
General Motors stock illegally held by du Pont was mandatory
under the Clayton Act and was necessary for effective relief. Its
plan of divestiture included (a) distribution of the stock to du
Pont's shareholders other than Delaware, Christiana and shareholders of Delaware14 and (b) sale of both the stock allocable to
s For a summary of §7 developments since the 1950 amendment, see Handler, "Recent
Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959," 59 CoL. L. REV. 843 (1959); Markham,
"Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal," 43 VA. L. REV. 489 (1957).
9 See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 335 (1947); United States v.
Great Lakes Towing Co., (N.D. Ohio 1914) 217 F. 656 at 659.
10 Most §7 complaints involve horizontal acquisitions and are heard by the FTC
rather than the federal courts. See Markham, "Merger Policy Under the New Section 7:
A Six-Year Appraisal," 43 VA. L. REv. 489 (1957). No prior case had involved more than
a short time lapse between the acquisition and the complaint. See United States v. du
Pont, 353 U.S. 586 at 589 (1957).
11 Du Pont held 63,000,000 shares of General Motors with a market value of approximately $3,500,000,000. See principal case at 13. Both corporations rank among the largest in the
nation. FORTUNE DIR.ECI'ORY OF TIIE 500 I..ARGESI' U.S. INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS, July 1956,

p.2
12 No one of du Font's 230,000 shareholders, General Motors' 700,000 shareholders and
Christiana's 4,000 shareholders was found guilty of an antitrust violation. See principal
case at 13.
13 Du Pont owned 23% of the General Motors shares, constituting a majority vote at
most General Motors meetings. Together Christiana and Delaware owned 30% of the
du Pont common stock, giving them a majority vote at most du Pont meetings. Through•
out the history of these four corporations, members of the du Pont family have served
concurrently as officers and board members of several of the four. See United States v. du
Pont, (N.D. Ill. 1954) 126 F. Supp. 235.
14 Distribution was to be made through annual dividends of General Motors stock
over a ten-year period, during which time a court-appointed trustee was to hold certificates
representing the General Motors stock and to distribute proxies to non-restricted share-
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the latter du Pont shareholders and that independently owned by
Christiana.15
The alternative proposed by the defendants and the amici16
called for partial divestiture17-du Pont retaining legal title to the
General Motors stock but passing through all voting rights to its
shareholders. Delaware and Christiana were in turn to pass
through the voting rights to their shareholders.
The court's plan of relief adopted the basic idea in the defendants' proposal: disenfranchisement. The voting rights on the
General Motors shares held by du Pont were passed through to its
shareholders.18 The court sterilized (I) votes passed-through to
Christiana and Delaware, (2) votes on Christiana's independentlyowned stock and (3) voting rights in any General Motors stock
held by directors and officers of du Pont, Christiana or Delaware.19
As ancillary relief the three corporations were prohibited from
acquiring stock of General Motors and influencing its management,20 and they and General Motors were enjoined from (a)
having common directors, officers or employees, (b) making preferential business arrangements and (c) carrying on joint enterprises.21

II.

POWER To AFFECT INTERESTS OF PARTIES AND NoN-PARTIES

Section 15 of the Clayton Act22 empowers the federal district
courts to "prevent and restrain" section 7 violations. This general
grant of power, identical to section 4 of the Sherman Act, 23 does
not specify who are proper parties in the proceeding or what inholders of du Pont (those other than Delaware, Christiana and shareholders of Delaware).
See principal case at 7-8.

15 The court-appointed trustee was to sell the stock over a ten-year period for the
account of these restricted du Pont shareholders, who were to have no voting rights in the
stock during this period. Principal case at 7-8. The government claimed that this sale
was necessary to prevent these shareholders from exerting control over General Motors to
further du Pont's interests. Id. at 45.
16 The court appointed amici curiae to represent the interests of du Pont and General
Motors shareholders; their relief proposals corresponded to the du Pont plan except for
more stringent injunctive provisions. See principal case at 6-9.
17 "Partial divestiture" throughout this comment refers to a plan of disenfranchisement whereby legal title to the stock is retained by the violator but all voting rights on
the stock are relinquished.
lSSee Final Judgment, (N.D. Ill.) Nov. 17, 1959, Provisions III, VI and VII.
19 See Final Judgment, note 18 supra, Provisions III, VI, VII and X.
20 See Final Judgment, note 18 supra, Provision III.
21 See Final Judgment, note 18 supra, Provisions IV and V.
22 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §25.
23 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §4.
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terests may be affected by the judgment. Although section 7 can
be violated only by an acquiring corporation24 and although the
section's objective can ordinarily be accomplished by dealing only
with that corporation, business affairs will not always present so
simple a situation with a correspondingly simple solution-as du
Pont has illustrated. An important question arises-can innocent
persons be made parties to a section 7 proceeding and can their
interests be affected by the court's decree?

A. Parties to a Relief Determination
In du Pont three non-violators were parties to the relief proceeding: General Motors, the company whose stock was unlawfully
held by du Pont, and Christiana and Delaware, influential shareholders of du Pont. The court's finding that these three corporations were at least proper parties to the relief determination25
seems contemplated in the philosophy of the federal rules26 and
section 15,27 and is consistent with the view in prior antitrust cases
that those persons who have substantial interests which may be
affected by the decree are proper parties to a relief proceeding.28
Assuming that the court deals directly with only the stock unlawfully held and the activities of the violator, its decision may
have a substantial impact both on the acquired corporation and
shareholders of the violator. The acquired corporation may be
(I) limited in its contractual arrangements with the violator,29 (2)
restricted as to its directors,30 (3) disabled from equity financing
because of large volume sales of its stock31 or (4) hindered in
24 See note 5 supra.
25 Although the district

court did not directly face the question of whether these corporations could be retained as parties, since all three desired to remain before the court,
it did assume the propriety of their being parties in considering the relief provisions affecting them. See principal case at 8. In denying the motion for dismissal of Christiana and
Delaware, the Supreme Court squarely held that they should be retained as parties to the
relief determination. United States v. du Pont, 353 U.S. 586 at 608 (1957).
26 See Rule 20, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1958), permitting joinder
as defendants of all persons against whom "there is asserted ••. any right to relief •••
arising out of .•• the same transaction ...•"
27 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §25.
28 See, generally, United States v. Columbia Gas Co., (D.C. Del. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 488;
Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922); United States v. Southern
Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912); United
States v. Lake Shore&: M.S. Ry. Co., (S.D. Ohio 1912) 203 F. 295.
29 See United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp.
215; Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922).
30 See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
31 See principal case at 51.
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adopting corporate policies because of sterilization of votes on its
stock.32 Shareholders of the violator may lose the opportunity to
buy stock disposed of by the violator3 3 and may encounter adverse
tax and market value experience on their stockholdings.34 Thus,
the shareholders and the acquired corporation have sufficient interests affected by the decree to be proper parties to a relief proceeding.
In addition, these non-violators are probably necessary parties
in a complex relief determination like du Pont. Federal rule
19 (b)35 requires joinder of persons "who ought to be parties if
complete relief is to be accorded between those already parties."
In du Pont the government's claim that special relief provisions
against Christiana and Delaware, key shareholders of du Pont,
were necessary to end the harmful effects of du Pont's violation
was approved by the court.36 That these measures against nonparties could not be justified on a theory of representation of shareholder interests by the corporate violator was illustrated by the
.court's denial of special relief against du Pont shareholders who
were also shareholders of Delaware; 37 this denial was properly
based on the principle that a corporation does not adequately
represent its shareholders when discriminatory treatment is sought
.against a class of shareholders.38 Thus, when the government
fears a perpetuation of anticompetitive pressures if illegally·acquired stock is distributed to key shareholders of the violator,
these shareholders must be made parties to obtain that special
relief against them necessary to effect complete relief in the case.
Du Pont also illustrates the necessity for making the acquired
corporation a party to the relief proceeding. Where intricate
restraints are to be placed on the voting rights of the violator, a
provision requiring the acquired corporation to aid in effectuating
32 See Final Judgment, (N.D. Ill.) Nov. 17, 1959, Provision VII, D, attempting to solve
this problem in the du Pont case. See also Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197 (1904). Cf. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 at 190 (1944).
. . 33 FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926); United States v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
226 U.S. 470 (1912).
34 See principal case at 51, and notes 73 and 74 infra.
35 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1958). Compare Fruit Growers Assn. v. FTC, (7th
Cir. 1921) 274 F. 205, finding a non-violator to be a necessary party, with United Shoe
Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), rejecting necessity of bringing in a
non-violator.
36 Principal case at 45. For the discussion of the court's power to decree these provisions against non-violators, see Section II-B of this comment.
37 Principal case at 12.
38 See Baltimore, C. &: A. Ry. v. Godeffroy, (4th Cir. 1910) 182 F. 525.
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these restraints will be highly desirable.39 Since the decree requiring its ministerial aid will act directly upon the corporation it
must be made a party to justify such a provision40 and to achieve
through it complete relief in the case.
In conclusion, this general proposition on party questions may
be derived from the du Pont decision: where a section 7 case is too
complex for the simple relief of direct disposition of illegally-held
stock, persons other than the violator may be proper or even
necessary parties to a section 15 relief proceeding.
B.

Power To Affect Interests

After deciding that four corporations were properly before it,
the du Pont court faced the question of what interests of these
parties could be affected by the decree and what interests of nonparties, if any, could be affected.

I. Interests of Parties. Clearly the court had power to order
disposition of the stock illegally acquired41 and to enjoin the violator from making further acquisitions.42 It could also order the
disposition to be made in such a way that no shareholder of the
violator could obtain any shares being divested. 43 It could provide
that the violator have no common director with the acquired corporation,44 and it could direct the violator to modify its contractual
arrangements with the acquired corporation as required to eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition. 45 As methods
of policing the decree, the court could require the violator to
submit compliance reports46 and could grant visitorial rights to
the government.47
As already indicated, remedial actions required of the violator
would often affect the interests of innocent persons. Thus, the
39 See du Pont Final Judgment, (N.D. Ill.) Nov. 17, 1959, Provision VI, for actions
required of the acquired corporation. See also Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197 at 355 (1904).
40 See United States v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., (S.D. Ohio 1912) 203 F. 295 at 318;
ICC v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 169 I.C.C. 618 at 642 (1934).
41 United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 470 (1912).
42 See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 425 (1945); Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 at 355 (1904).
43 See cases cited note 33 supra.
44 See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v.
Columbia Gas Co., (D.C. Del. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 488.
45 See cases cited note 29 supra.
46 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 433 (1945); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
47United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
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shareholders of the violator would lose the right to buy the stock
disposed of, and the acquired corporation would lose the right to
make certain types of contracts with the violator. But the federal
courts have held that such indirect effects on non-violators are
proper if the court finds them necessary to "prevent and restrain"
an antitrust violation.48
In addition, however, the du Pont court granted many of the
government's requests for direct relief against the three nonviolators.49 The court had little guidance for its decision since the
Clayton Act is silent on whether the court can so affect nonviolators,50 and there are few cases with the complex facts which
would raise this question.51 In fact, in relatively few cases have the
courts even granted substantial "indirect" relief against innocent
persons.52
Congress has power under the commerce clause of the Constitution to affect interests of these persons.53 Although it has not
expressly exercised this power, the generality of section 15 by
inference authorizes the courts to affect non-violators whenever
necessary to protect the public from the harm of a Clayton Act
violation. 54
More specifically, it appears that the acquired corporation may
be directly acted upon where a contract for sale of stock is executory;55 and, even if the sale has been executed, it seems reasonable
48 See FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926); United States v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 226 U.S. 470 (1912); and United States v. Columbia Gas Co., (D.C. Del. 1941) 36 F.
Supp. 488, affecting shareholders; United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U.S.
451 (1922), affecting lessees; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904),
affecting acquired corporations.
49 See section II of this comment supra. See also principal case at 47, where the court
expressed doubt as to its power to grant such relief.
50 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §25.
51 See United States v. Columbia Gas Co., (D.C. Del. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 488; Continental
Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922); United States v. Lake Shore &: M.S. Ry. Co.,
(S.D. Ohio 1916) 281 F. 1007.
52 See cases cited note 48 supra.
53 See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
54 See cases cited note 51 supra. Cf. United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214
(1922); United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912); In re Consolidated Electric Co.,
(D.C. Del. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 211 at 216, where the court stated that "rights of security
holders may be altered and adjusted to the extent necessary to effectuate the object and
purposes of compliance with the antitrust laws."
The du Pont court held that §15 authorized relief against non-violating defendants "not
because they have violated the statute but because the . . . relief is an appropriate and
necessary exercise of the power of this court to •.. dissipate the consequences of the stock
acquisition found to be unlawful." Principal case at 12.
55 See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1958) 168 F. Supp. 576, and
United States v. Brown Shoe Co., (E.D. Mo. 1956) CCH Trade Gas. 1J68,244 (1956) and
1J69,532 (1959).
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to require that corporation to help carry out a decree in a ministerial capacity. Perhaps since the court could indirectly regulate
qualifications for its board of directors and limit its contractual
relations with the violator,56 the court should be able to do so directly if the corporation is before it. Finally, the acquiring corporation may have developed habits of cooperation with the management of the acquired corporation which are keystones of the
competitive harm from the acquisition.57 To eliminate this "community of interest" effectively, direct action against both corporations may be required.
On the other hand, the fact that the acquired corporation
should be a party to protect its interests from indirect interference
in the decree does not mean that direct measures against these interests are necessarily justified. While direct measures ensure
greater likelihood of the desired result, they also may operate
harshly on the acquired corporation by subjecting it to the business uncertainty which accompanies an injunction.58
Somewhat different is the problem of relief against certain
important shareholders of the violating corporation, who, like the
acquired corporation, are innocent parties. The courts have
recognized that a substantial, or even controlling, shareholder is
not necessarily a co-violator with the corporation59 and that there
may be no substantial danger in distributing the illegally-acquired
stock to such shareholders.60 However, the courts have also
realized that a distribution to shareholders may not end the unlawful effects of the acquisition, 61 for a few large shareholders may
exert continued pressure on the acquired corporation through the
shares that they obtain.62 This problem of shareholder pressure
will arise only when sale of the stock allocable to key shareholders
is not feasible, so that the stock must be distributed to them.63
56 See
57 See

cases cited notes 29 and 30 supra.
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215
at 237; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 394.
58 See Brown, "Injunctions and Divestiture," 5 A.B.A. REP., ANTITRUST SECTION, 129
(1954).
119 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at 441.
60 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Northern Securities Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
61 United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 470 (1912).
62 For the difficulty in establishing that a group of shareholders will act in concert and
will have the power to control or influence a corporation, see principal case at 46; United
States v. du Pont, (N.D. Ill. 1954) 126 F. Supp. 235 at 239; United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416.
63 See principal case at 51.
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The court should then place such restrictions as are necessary on
the activities of these shareholders. 64 Voting restrictions on the
distributed stock or restraints on the use by shareholders of their
position to influence the acquired corporation would seem necessary. Prohibiting common directors might also be a reasonable
limitation. However, limitations on rights in shareholders' independently-owned stock of the acquired corporation and regulations on their business relations with it are of doubtful reasonableness. Since a sale of the shares allocable to them would leave their
own shares untouched, a distribution of stock to them with sufficient limitations should make restrictions on rights in their own
stock unnecessary.
Yet in du Pont restrictions were placed on Christiana's independently-held shares of General Motors, although the distribution
to it of votes on the du Pont-held shares was not only limited but
actually nullified by a sterilization of these votes.65 It therefore
appears that the court was using a broader concept than reasonable limitations on a stock distribution to justify action against key
shareholders of the violator.66 In determining the necessary relief
it saw du Pont, Christiana and Delaware as a single force-a corporation and its corporate shareholders united by a common design
and common management.67 It looked through du Pont as a
separate corporate entity to the corporations controlling it, and
through the latter to the individuals controlling them, and then
directed its relief against the activities of this entire group. 68 Other
courts have ignored the form of separate corporate entities and
have taken substance into account in framing their antitrust decrees. 69 This realistic approach, necessary to ensure effective anti64 Cf. In re Consolidated Electric Co., (D.C. Del. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 211; Continental
Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922).
65 Final Judgment, Nov. 17, 1959, Provision VI, A. See principal case at 47, where the
court granted the sterilization as "appropriate," while doubting its authority to do so.
Since this measure was not found "necessary" to end the harm from du Pont's stockholding,
it seems improper.
66 It found its §15 powers authorized any action against non-violators which was necessary and appropriate to eliminate the unlawful effects of the acquisition. See principal
case at 12.
67 Although the government had failed to establish that Christiana and Delaware
would act in concert to control General Motors, certain relief measures against them were
appropriate "because of their substantial stock interest in du Pont, and because of the
long-standing close relationship between these two companies and the management of du
Pont." Principal case at 45-46.
68 See du Pont Final Judgment, (N.D. Ill.) Nov. 17, 1959, Provision VI, A, running
against the management group in the three corporations, and note 67 supra.
69 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416 at
441; United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 470 (1912).
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trust relief,70 will generally be used whenever there is a probability71 that shareholders of the violator will act to nullify the aim of
the decree.
The du Pont decision has pushed the exercise of power over
non-violators to its far limits. Although it is difficult to imagine
that Congress contemplated this breadth in its grant of jurisdiction,
it seems that a reasonable basis for power does exist in the generality
of the section 15 grant of remedial power. Thus, under section 15
as to stands today, judicial power will be limited only by what is
necessary to carry out the aims of the Clayton Act, thereby permitting the courts to affect interests of non-violators in the extraordinary cases like du Pont.

2. Interests of Non-Parties. As already indicated, the courts
deem themselves empowered to affect indirectly certain interests of
those not parties to a relief determination. For instance, sales of
the divested stock by the violator to its shareholders may be enjoined. Similarly, the violator can be prevented from having as
officers persons with key positions in other corporations. In these
situations the courts consider the interests of the shareholders or
officers as represented by the corporate violator.72
Even more indirect effects than these may be allowed when the
corporation does not adequately represent the shareholder interests involved. For example, the manner of disposition of the
illegally-held stock may have adverse tax effects73 upon shareholders of the violator and may inflict market value losses74 upon
shareholders of both the acquiring and acquired corporations. Yet
adequate representation on the disposition question by the corporations is unlikely since (1) these matters deal with individual interests of shareholders, related to their stockholdings but separate
70 See government litigation against the Reading Co. in United States v. Reading Co.,
226 U.S. 324 (1912); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); and Continental Ins.
Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922), as an example.
71 The courts have demanded stronger evidence of shareholder control over a corporation to establish a violation by shareholders than to authorize relief provisions against
shareholders. See principal case; United States v. du Pont, (N.D. Ill. 1954) 126 F. Supp.
235; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333; United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416. See also presumption
for government on relief questions, Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 at 299 (1934).
72 See United States v. Pullman Co., (E.D. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123 at 136; United
States v. Columbia Gas Co., (D.C. Del. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 488 at 495; United States v.
Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U.S. 470 (1912).
73 Principal case at 15-21 and 51.
74 Principal case at 42 and 51.
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from corporate affairs75 and (2) there will be a wide variation in
tax effects on different types of shareholders.76
Although the courts have felt that these collateral effects of a
decree do not call for direct representation, they have tried to take
such non-party interests into account in determining what mode
of relief is most advisable,77 as for example in du Pont by the appointment of two amici curiae78 to inform the court of the effects
that proposed relief might have on General Motors and du Pont
shareholders. Such a device is helpful by providing for full consideration of shareholder interests without the problems of organizing shareholder representatives, of having disproportionate representation of certain shareholder classes,79 and of arousing the
prejudice against intervening parties in antitrust cases.80 Although probably unnecessary in the ordinary section 7 case, this
device is advisable in the complex case where there will be serious
repercussions on innocent persons from any plan of relief adopted.
Another method for dealing with non-party interests was employed in du Pont to sterilize the voting power of certain individuals not before the court. The decree provided that all persons
"who are directors or officers of du Pont, Christiana or Delaware,
and the members of the family of any such director or officer who
reside in the same household" are enjoined from voting any General Motors stock.81 The court avoided the question of its power to
affect so directly voting rights of non-parties inadequately represented by any party8 2 by requiring the corporate parties to obtain
written consents to the decree from the non-parties affected.83 By
using the corporate parties as the means of obtaining consents to
principal case at 12.
different impact from stock distribution upon individual, corporate and taxexempt du Pont shareholders, principal case at 51.
77 United States v. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. 106 at 185 (1911).
78 Principal case at 6. See also United States v. Columbia Gas Co., (D.C. Del. 1941)
36 F. Supp. 488 at 492, utilizing this same method.
79 On these shareholder representation problems, see Fennell, "The Representation of
Security Holders' Interests Under Section 77," 7 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 474 (1940).
so The courts have been reluctant to allow intervention of private parties in antitrust
cases under rule 24. See HALE AND HALE, MARKET POWER-SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER nm
SHERMAN Acr 381 (1958); United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, (S.D. N.Y. 1949) 10
F.R.D. 73 at 75-77; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 at 177-178 (1948).
81 Final Judgment, (N.D. Ill.) Nov. 17, 1959, Provision VI, A.
82 The corporate parties did not adequately represent these corporate officials on questions relating to their individual voting rights as General Motors shareholders, as distinct
from their official actions for the corporations. See principal case at 12.
83 Final Judgment, note 81 supra, Provision X, enjoined du Pont, Christiana and Delaware from having as an officer or director any person who did not file the consents of
himself and his family to be bound by the voting provisions of the decree.
75 See
76 See
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necessary restrictions on the management group, the court can
achieve the relief necessary for the public economic welfare in a
complex section 7 situation without facing the section 15 power
question84 and without the inconvenience of bringing in numerous
additional parties.

III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE MODE OF RELIEF
In the usual section 7 case an order that the violator sell the
shares or distribute them to its shareholders removes the harmful
effect of an acquisition. But du Pont illustrates a case where this
simple solution will have serious disadvantages-a case where the
court must directly face the question whether complete disposal of
the stock is the proper, or even required, mode of relief.

A. Complete Divestiture as a Mandatory Remedy
There are three general types of judicial measures affording
antitrust relief: (I) the simple prohibitory injunction, (2) the
regulatory injunction and (3) dissolution, divorcement or divestiture.85 Before determining which of these measures were appropriate in the light of the du Pont facts, the court had to dispose of
the government's contention that the third type-divestiture-was
mandatory in section 7 cases.86 The government argued that (1)
divestiture is mandatory in relief granted by regulatory commissions under section 11 of the act87 and (2) the courts acting under
section 15 are bound by section 11 requirements.
l. Divestiture by Regulatory Commissions Under Section 11.
Several factors support the government contention that complete
divestiture is mandatory under section 11: (a) use in the section of
the impliedly mandatory verb "shall" ;88 (b) the commissions'
practice of ordering complete divestiture; 89 and (c) pre-enactment

84 See the denial of relief against unrepresented du Pont shareholders, principal case
at 12. And see rule 19(b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1958).
85 See Brown, "Injunctions and Divestiture," 5 A.B.A. REP., ANTITRUsr SECTION, 129
(1954).
86 The court held that federal courts are not compelled to order complete divestiture
under §15, and declined to decide whether §11 requires an agency order of divestiture.
Principal case at 15-16.
87 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U .S.C. (1958) §21.
88 Section 11 provides that upon finding a section 7 violation "the Commission •••
shall issue •.. an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such violations, and
divest itself of the stock...."
89 See Vanadium-Alloys Steel Co., 18 F.T.C. 194 (1934); FTC v. Western Meat Co.,
Swift & Co. v. FTC, Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); Aluminum Co. of
America v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1922) 284 F. 401.
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statements by senators in terms of taking the stock away from the
violator.90
These factors do not necessarily establish a congressional intent
to require an order of divestiture. Neither congressional debates91
nor administrative practice92 are conclusive as to the proper interpretation of a statute. Furthermore, the regulatory agencies have
in several cases attempted to effect relief with a flexibility beyond
the usual direct sale,93 and the FTC has consented to such flexible
decrees.94 Finally, the word "shall" itself is not determinative of
whether a provision is mandatory.95
Congress may well have specified divestiture as an agency
remedy merely to make clear that this relief measure is within the
agencies' permissive delegated powers.96 The fact that Congress
provided for the FTC to act as a master to recommend a decree to
the courts in section 7 cases.97 clearly indicates that Congress considered the FTC competent to work out the flexible decrees authorized under the courts' equitable powers. And the authority
to use a similar flexibility in its own orders may be impliedly
granted in the phrase of section 11 providing for divestiture "in
the manner" the commission fixes in its order.98 Therefore, the
proposition that regulatory agencies have no power to order a
mode of partial divestiture in the complex situation like du Pont
is of doubtful validity.
2. Divestiture by the Federal Courts Under Section 15. Even
if the federal regulatory agencies must order complete divestiture,
it does not necessarily follow that the courts, authorized to remedy
section 7 violations under the broad language of section 15,99 are
bound by the limitations on these agencies. This section is identical to section 4 of the Sherman Act, which has been interpreted to
90 51 CONG. REc. 14328 (1914).
91 See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S.
92 United States v. du Pont, 353 U.S. 586 at 611 (1957).
93 See ICC v. Baltimore 8e Ohio R. Co., 183 I.C.C. 165 (1932);

384 (1951).

N.Y., Chicago 8e St. Louis
R. Co., I.C.C. Finance Docket No. 17883 (order of Aug. 26, 1958).
94 See In re Vendo Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ,i26,724 (1958); Union Bag 8e Paper Co.,
<::CH Trade Reg. Rep. ,i25,999 (1957); International Paper Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
,i25,560 (1957); Scoville Mfg. Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1126,606 (1956).
95 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
96 The necessity for specifically granting permissive powers to the FTC is illustrated
in Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
97 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §47. Cf. United States v. International Salt Co.,
.332 U.S. 392 at 400, n. 10 (1948).
98 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §21.
99 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §25.
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grant full equitable power to fit the relief to the peculiar circumstances of each case.100 It appears that if Congress had intended to
deny the courts a similar flexibility under section 15, it would have
expressly provided for a substantial change in powers by using
language different from that in the Sherman Act in the grant of
remedial jurisdiction.101
While a few courts have ordered divestiture in section 7 cases
as a matter of course,102 there is no indication that these courts
deemed themselves bound to decree complete divestiture if the
circumstances were to make such relief neither fair nor feasible.
Moreover, the courts have refused to order divestiture in section
7 cases,103 and the government has recently consented to several
decrees of limited divestiture.104 Although most Sherman Act
decisions involving an unlawful stockholding have ordered divestiture,105 the courts have consistently recognized their power to
fashion a different remedy when divestiture is impractical or unnecessary to achieve effective relief.106
The most recent divestiture decree under section 4 was upheld
in the International Boxing Club decision,107 apparently on the
basis that the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering
divestiture since it found this measure necessary to eliminate the
unlawful effects of the stockholding. This decision, together with
100 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 at 400-401 (1947); United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 355 (1948).
101 See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). See also S. Rep. 698, 63d Cong., 2d
sess., pp. 49-50 (1914); H. Rep. 6'2:/, 63d Cong., 2d sess., p. 21 (1914), indicating congressional intent to mold §15 after §4 jurisdiction.
102 See United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Assn., Inc., (D.C. D.C.
1958) 167 F. Supp. 799, affd. on divestiture issue, 80 S.Ct. 847 (1960); United States v. New
England Fish Exchange, (D.C. Mass. 1919) 258 F. 732; id., (D.C. Mass. 1923) 292 F. 511.
103 See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1957)
152 F. Supp. 387, affd. (2d Cir. 1958) 259 F. (2d) 524. But see reluctance of courts to
decree divestiture at suit of private party. HALE AND HALE, MARKET Powm - SIZE AND
SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN Acr 370 (1958).
104 See United States v. Anheuser-Busch, (S.D. Fla. 1960) CCH Trade Cas. ,i69,599;
United States v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., (D.C. Utah 1958) CCH Trade Cas. iJ69,160;
United States v. Schenley Industries, (D.C. Del. 1957) CCH Trade Cas. iJ68,664; United
States v. General Shoe Corp., (D.C. Tenn. 1956) CCH Trade Cas. 1f68,271; United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., (N.D. Ill. 1956) CCH Trade Cas. iJ68,253.
105 See REPORT OF THE A"ITORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITfEE TO STUDY THE ANTI·
TRUST LAws 354 (1955), listing twenty cases in which unlawful stock combinations have been
subjected to divestiture decrees. See also International Boxing Club v. United States, 358
U.S. 242 (1959).
106 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835; Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 356.
101 International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
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the movie theater cases,108 shows the trend of the courts to find
divestiture a necessary remedy more readily than they did in the
past; but it does not establish the proposition that complete divestiture must be ordered regardless of the peculiar circumstances of
a case.
Furthermore, the language of the Supreme Court in remanding
the du Pont case to the district court for relief strongly suggests
that a trial court should exercise its traditionally broad equity
powers in fashioning its decree:
"The judgment must therefore be ... remanded to the District Court for a determination, after further hearing, of the
equitable relief necessary and appropriate in the public interest to eliminate the effects of the acquisition offensive to the
statute. The District Courts, in the framing _of equitable
decrees, are clothed 'with large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of the particular case.' International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400, 401.''109
This language indicates in several ways that complete divestiture
of the illegally-held stock is not mandatory under section 15. The
Court speaks of an equitable decree and defines the proper relief
as that necessary and appropriate in the public interest to eliminate
the unlawful effects of the acquisition. The Court recognized that
the holding of the stock itself is not necessarily the evil to be
remedied-the evil is the harmful effect on competition caused by
voting rights or financial ties arising from the stockholding.110 If
these causes of the harmful effect can be eliminated by a mode of
relief other than complete divestiture, the courts should have the
power under section 15 to refuse to decree divestiture.
B.

Divestiture as a "Necessary and Appropriate" Remedy

While the federal courts have power to require divestiture of
stock under their section 4 and 15 authority to "prevent and restrain" violations of the antitrust laws,11 1 there is no certainty as
108 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres
v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S.
173 (1944).
109 United States v. du Pont, 353 U.S. 586 at 607 (1957).
110 See United States v. du Pont, 353 U.S. 586 at 597 (1957); Aluminum Co. of America
v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1922) 284 F. 401 at 405. See also the §7 proviso that "This section shall
not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for investment and not using the
same by voting or otherwise to bring about .•• the substantial lessening of competition .
• • . " 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §18.
111 HALE AND HALE, MARKET PoWER - SIZE AND SHAPE UNDER THE SHERMAN Arrr 370-371
(1958).
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to when the courts should exercise this power. Since section 7 has
not been extensively utilized until recently, most cases dealing with
divestiture involve Sherman Act violations. The general principles developed in these decisions provide useful guidance in
formulating an approach to Clayton Act relief.

I. Divestiture Under the Sherman Act. Sherman Act decisions have developed the following general principles in relief
determinations: (a) the objective of the decree is to remedy a harmful economic condition, not to punish a violator of the statute; 112
(b) the trial court has wide discretion to fit the decree to the needs
of a particular case; 113 (c) the decree must effectively eliminate the
competitive harm; 114 and (d) the plan of relief must be feasible 115
and fair to the public, the violators, and persons interested in
them.11 6
The judicial approach resulting from these principles is to
grant that relief which is "necessary and appropriate" to end the
harmful effects of an antitrust violation. What measures are
"necessary" will depend upon the type of violation and its effects
on competition,11 7 the attitude of the violator118 and the peculiar
circumstances of the violation. What relief is "appropriate" will
depend on what is fair and feasible under these same circumstances.119
The next question is how divestiture fits into this general ap112United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 338 (1947); Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 409 (1945); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911).
113 See cases cited note 100 supra.
114 See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 334 (1947); United States v.
Great Lakes Towing Co., (N.D. Ohio 1914) 217 F. 656; United States v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 226 U.S. 470 at 476 (1912).
115 United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835 at 871;
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1953) 110 F. Supp. 295 at 348;
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 417; United
States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
116 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 211 U.S.
1 (1911).
117 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333
at 345, indicating greater feasibility and likelihood of divestiture of stock than of a business
unit. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I at 77 (1911), indicating greater need
for divestiture where violation is an accomplished monopolization.
118 Compare Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) and
United States v. American Can Co., (D.C. Md. 1916) 234 F. 1019, with United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 347, and United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 at 186 (1944).
119 See United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 338 and 352 (1947), But
see principal case at 42-47; and Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 at 301, apparently
using "appropriateness" as an alternative to "necessity" as justification for relief measures.
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proach to remedies. The most recent answers have appeared in
the movie theater cases120 and the International Boxing Club decision.121 The Supreme Court has outlined the functions of divestiture as three:
"(I) It puts an end to the combination or conspiracy when
that is itself the violation. (2) It deprives the antitrust defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy. (3) It is designed
to break up or render impotent the monopoly power which
violates the Act."122
Although language in several decisions hints that divestiture is required whenever it can serve one of these three functions,123 it
does not seem that the courts have really substituted these specific
criteria for the "necessary and appropriate" test.124 Rather it
seems that these are the objectives which divestiture may be
necessary and appropriate to achieve. The cases do not say that
measures other than divestiture cannot be used if they would
effectively achieve the same results.
The trend is clear-the courts are more ready to find divestiture
necessary than in prior years.125 Perhaps this trend results from
judicial acceptance of the government's argument that injunctions
are ineffective because of the impossibility of adequately policing
them.126 Or perhaps it is the result of stronger government evidence to show that measures short of divestiture will not be effective in a particular case.127
120 See cases cited note 108 supra.

121 See International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
122 Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 at 128-129 (1948).
123 International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 at 256 (1959);

United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 at 152 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 at 128 (1948).
124 " .•• there is no specific requirement of any anti-trust statute, or, indeed, of any
case familiar to the Court, that dissolution and divestiture must always occur. The Court
may withhold its hand in connection with dissolution in those cases where the anti-trust
advantages are not sufficiently compelling to outweigh other disadvantages." United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 356 at 358. See
United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835; United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215 at 241; Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333. See also the propensity of the defendants for
unlawful conduct stressed in the cases cited note 123 supra.
125 See note, 13 s.w. L. J. 263 (1959); HALE AND HALE, MARKET POWER-SIZE AND SHAPE
UNDER THE SHERMAN Acr 370-380 (1958); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D.
N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 333 at 342-343.
126 See Berge, "Some Problems in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws," 38 MICH.
L. REv. 462 at 469 (1940); Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 at 128
(1948). But see Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 604 (1951).
127 See Adams, "Dissolution, Divorcement and Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of
Antitrust," 27 IND. L. J. l at 32-34 (1951).
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Therefore, the Sherman Act cases offer this guide for determining whether a decree of divestiture is required: if other measures
can effectively neutralize the unlawful effects of the violation,
divestiture will not be necessary. Since these measures will be
less harsh than divestiture, they will be appropriate as well as
necessary.
2. Divestiture of Stock Under the Clayton Act. The du Pont
court recognized that the basic purpose of relief in a section 7 case
is the same as that in a Sherman Act decision-to dissipate the
harmful effects of the violation and to restore competition to the
industry. Therefore, it found that the general approach to relief
should be the same in both types of cases. In other words, a court
dealing with an unlawful stock acquisition would order divestiture
when "necessary and appropriate" to eliminate the reasonable
probability of lessened competition or monopolization.128
To make the Sherman-Clayton analogy complete it is necessary
to translate into Clayton Act terms the three specific objectives of
relief formulated by the Supreme Court in the Schine decision.129
The first of these objectives-ending the combination that violates
the Sherman Act-compares to ending the stockholding that violates section 7. The stockholding, like the combination, is illegal
only when its effect is to lessen competition; therefore, the unlawful stockholding may be ended by eliminating either the holding
itself or only its harmful effect. The second objective-depriving
the defendant of the fruits of its violation-calls for depriving the
violator of section 7 of the benefit of its unlawful acquisition. This
benefit would appear to be the unfair competitive advantage gained
through the stock, not the stock itself.130 The final objectiveending the monopoly power that violates the Sherman Act-requires in section 7 cases dissipation of the incipient monopoly
power obtained through the stock.
These objectives merge into one basic aim in a section 7 case:
to eliminate the tendency of the stockholding to lessen competition
or create a monopoly. Certainly complete divestiture of the stock
would be a simple method-and a very effective one-for achieving
this basic aim. The fact that this method requires less court
supervision than numerous regulatory injunctions would make it
appear not only effective but also desirable under Sherman Act
128 Principal case at 50.
129 334 U.S. 110 at 128-129 (1948). See text at note 122 supra.
130 Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950)

91 F. Supp. 333 at
346; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 at 358 (1904).
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principles.131 However, divestiture is a harsh remedy, resembling
punishment more than relief when it is not "necessary" to eliminate the harm from the violation.132 It is for this reason that Sherman Act decisions have refused to use it when there are other
effective means for achieving the same result.133 It is for this same
reason that the du Pont court rejected it.134
A rejection of divestiture is proper only if other regulatory
measures can efjectively eliminate the harm to competition from
the stockholding. At least where there is a vertical acquisition of
stock by a seller corporation, the harmful effect is the preference
gained over other sellers, resulting from use of the stock to influence
the buying corporation's management and business decisions.135
With voting power on the stock neutralized, the chief means of
using the stock to influence the buyer is ended.136 The remaining
financial interest of the seller in the buyer probably affords little
opportunity for the former to influence buying decisions of the
latter.137 Thus partial divestiture by disenfranchisement may so
effectively eliminate both the cause of the harmful effect and the
effect itself that complete divestiture will be unnecessary.
If either divestiture or disenfranchisement is "necessary" to
end the danger to competition from a section 7 violation, the latter
measure should be selected as the "appropriate" relief when it is
more feasible or fair than complete divestiture. In du Pont the
court found it more feasible in view of grave doubts as to the
131 See United States v. Pullman Co., (E.D. Pa. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 123 at 136.
132 There is no "sharp line which can be drawn between punishment or dissipation."

Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 440 (1945).
133 See United States v. General Electric Co., United States v. Imperial Chemical In•
dustries, United States v. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co., and Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, note 124 supra; United States v. American Can Co., (D. C. Md. 1916) 234 F.
1019; United States v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
134 "To redress a violation of law in this case is fairly simple, but to do it without
punishing innocent people is the big problem here." Principal case at 13.
135 See note 110 supra.
136 "It is well recognized that the normal and indeed the only way in which the
holder of a substantial block of stock can influence the practices and the policies of the
corporation is through the exercise or threatened exercise of voting rights or by representation on the Board of Directors.'' Principal case at 40-41. See also emphasis on voting
rights and their elimination in International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 at
256 (1959); Hughes v. United States, 342 U. S. 353 (1952); United States v. Columbia Gas
Co., (D.C. Del. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 488.
137 "In this case, however, the buying decision must be made by General Motors. It
has no financial interest in du Pont and the Court is aware of no incentive which would
operate to influence a General Motors employee to favor du Pont in any way.'' Principal
case at 48. Cf. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 at 424-425 (1945). But
see limitations on security interests in Continental Ins. Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156
(1922); United States v. Lake Shore &: M.S. Ry. Co., (S.D. Ohio 1916) 281 F. 1007.
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marketability of the large volume of General Motors stock.138
Furthermore, it found disenfranchisement fairer because of the
tax and market value losses that a stock distribution or sale might
cause to numerous innocent investors in du Pont and General
Motors.139 The courts have recognized that private property rights
of even the violators of the antitrust laws are not to be injured
unless the injury cannot be avoided,140 and they have generally
shown even greater concern for the interests of innocent investors
in the violating corporations.141 Therefore, the du Pont court
properly considered the possible harm to shareholders in rejecting
divestiture of the stock as inappropriate.
The government has appealed the district court's relief decision
to the Supreme Court, claiming in the alternative that the court
either (1) had no discretionary power to grant disenfranchisement
rather than complete divestiture or (2) if it had discretionary
power, it erroneously utilized that power in rejecting divestiture
as unnecessary and inappropriate.142
It appears, however, that the district courts are granted full
equitable discretionary powers by section 15 of the Clayton Act and
that in light of the "peculiar circumstances" of the du Pont case
the district court properly invoked these powers to formulate a fair
and effective decree. It also seems that the court has significantly
added to antitrust relief development by its crystallization of a
"Rule of Reason" approach for section 7 relief, comparable to that
in the Alcoa143 decision for Sherman Act remedies. Although the
court's application of general principles cannot be separated from
138 Principal
139 Principal

case at 42 and 51.
case at 51. See also United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., (D.C.
Mass. 1959) 96 F. Supp. 356 on tax losses. In the principal case, at 52, Judge La.Buy
indicated that a change in the tax consequences of the stock distribution might make such
distribution an appropriate remedy. Although as yet neither S. 200 nor H. R. 8126, 86th
Cong., 1st sess., recent proposals for tax relief on court-ordered stock distributions, has
been passed, the House bill has been favorably reported out of committee. See H. Rep.
ll28, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (1959).
140 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United
States v. Pullman Co., (E.D. Pa. 1944) 53 F. Supp. 908; United States v. American Can Co.,
(D.C. Md. 1916) 234 F. 1019; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (19ll). But
injury to the defendants will not prevent use of a necessary relief measure: United States
v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 at 366 (1947); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., (D.C. Del. 1911) 188 F. 127 at 153.
141 See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 at 452-453 (1920); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (19ll). But see United States v. Com
Products Refining Co., (2d Cir. 1916) 234 F. 964 at 1017; United States v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 226 U.S. 470 at 476 (1912).
142 Probable jurisdiction noted, 28 U.S. LAw WEEK 3346 (1960).
143 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp 333.

1044

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

the facts of the du Pont case so as to furnish specific guides to courts
facing different section 7 factual situations, its approach in determining the proper relief will offer valuable assistance to these
other courts.
Barbara B. Burt, S. Ed.

